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 — ✤  CHAPTER EIGHT ✤ —  
 How Capitalism 
Will Change 
 N iels Bohr, the brilliant Nobel laureate in physics, once complained, “It is diffi cult to make predic-
tions, especially about the future.” Despite his warning, 
let’s try. Even if we cannot know exactly how capital-
ism will change, we can, perhaps, detect some probable 
trends and directions. 
 Our fi rst task is to survey some of the major forces 
that could lead to important institutional transforma-
tions. We then ask what types of general systemic change 
might result from such institutional transformations. 
Finally, we turn to existing capitalist systems and specu-
late briefl y but with more specifi city on how they might 
change in the next half-century. 
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 A.  Short-Run Factors Possibly Infl uencing 
Major Institutional and Systemic Change 
 Traumatic political/economic events are often a cause of 
major institutional change. For instance, Russia’s defeat 
in the Crimean War (1854–56) set in motion forces that 
resulted in the abolition of serfdom fi ve years later. The 
Great Depression of the 1930s led to greater state interven-
tion into the economies of the OECD nations and much 
higher welfare transfers to the population. Less dramati-
cally, British discontent with slow, uneven production 
growth in the post–World War II years appears to have 
played a major role in Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 political 
victory and to have allowed her to make changes in the 
economic system, particularly the dismantling of govern-
mental controls and detailed planning of the economy. 
 Will a transformation on the scale of what happened 
in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s again occur in 
the OECD nations as a result of the world economic crisis 
that took place at the end of the fi rst decade of the twen-
ty-fi rst century? To provide some perspective on this 
question,  Table 8–1 presents data on growth and fl uctua-
tions of aggregate production from 1975 through 2007 
that supplements the data presented in  Table 6–3 . 1 While 
 1  The data in  Table 6–3 are, however, organized according to perfor-
mance system, rather than economic system. That table also looks 
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 Table 8–1.  GDP Growth and Fluctuations in Industrial Capitalist Nations, 1975–2007 a  
Country  Average  Annual 
 GDP  Growth 
 Fluctuation 
 Measure 
Country  Average  Annual 
 GDP  Growth 
 Fluctuation 
 Measure 
A. Countries with a  mostly Anglo-Saxon economic system  B. Countries with a  Nordic economic  system 
 Australia 3.22% 2.35%  Denmark 2.14% 2.09%
 Canada 2.78 2.84  Finland 2.50 5.19
 Ireland 5.20 9.78  Norway 3.06 2.47
 Japan 2.53 6.72  Sweden 2.07 3.54
 New Zealand 2.25 5.33
 Switzerland? 1.64 2.20
 UK 2.42 3.85
 USA 3.06 2.12
Average 2.89 4.27 Average 2.44 3.22
 C. Nations with a  West European  economic system  D. Nations with a  South European  economic system 
 Austria 2.35% 1.70%  Greece 2.05% 6.56%
 Belgium 2.12 1.57  Italy 2.02 3.50
 France 2.16 1.80  Portugal 2.94 4.38
 Germany 2.13 3.13  Spain 2.82 3.87
Netherlands 2.58 3.03
Average 2.27 2.25 Average 2.46 4.58
 a The fl uctuation measure is the average square of the deviation of each point from the ordinary least squares 
regression line used to determine the average annual GDP growth rate. It is also called the “mean square error.” 
The GDP data come from the World Bank’s  World Development Indicators  www.worldbank.org . 
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economic growth was certainly not dramatic in this 
period, which preceded the major economic crisis start-
ing in 2007/2008, voters in the various countries did not 
appear to be suffi ciently discontented with the economic 
system to force major changes, at least not at the time of 
writing. Equally important, none of the four capitalist 
economic systems in this period appears markedly supe-
rior in its macroeconomic performance. More specifi -
cally, the initial level of per capita GDP and the exposure 
to the outside world (measured in terms of the ratio of 
exports and imports to the GDP) are held constant, only 
the  mostly Anglo-Saxon economic system had slightly (but 
statistically signifi cant) higher growth rates than nations 
with the other systems; and only the nations with a  West 
European economic system had a slightly lower (but sta-
tistically signifi cant) rate of fl uctuation of the GDP. 2 
at growth of per capita GDP, while  Table 8–1 focuses just on GDP 
growth. 
 2  This calculation is similar to that shown in  Table 6–3 but differs 
in that other possible causes of macroeconomic performance are 
held constant (namely, initial per capita GDP and openness of the 
economy). I also experimented with two other measures of fl uc-
tuations, the coeffi cient of determination of the GDP regressions 
and the average unemployment rate over the period. When other 
factors were held constant, neither of these two indicators revealed 
any statistically signifi cant difference between the four economic 
systems. 
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 In the recent global recession, measured from the 3d 
quarter of 2007 to the 3d quarter of 2009, the average 
annual decline in real GDP was 1.7 percent. 3 This decline, 
however, varied considerably among the OECD countries, 
with the countries with a Nordic economic system experi-
encing the greatest average fall in GDP; and the countries 
with a West European system, the least. Nevertheless, 
these differences were not statistically signifi cant. 
 Such results, combined with those in  Table 6–3 , mean 
that no particular type of capitalism provided a clear 
model of emulation for the others, at least with regard 
to GDP growth. 4 Instead, the governments’ policies and 
 3  The data in this paragraph come from the OECD Web site  www.
OECD.org and were the last available at the time of writing. 
 4  Of course, this doesn’t necessarily mean that a greatly different 
economic system, such as central planning, would provide bet-
ter results. For a comparison between economic performance of 
capitalist and centrally planned economies, see Frederic L. Pryor , 
 Economic Systems of Foraging, Agricultural, and Industrial Societies (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  op. cit .; “Growth and 
Fluctuations of Production in OECD and East European Nations,” 
 World Politics 37, no. 2 (January 1985): 204–38; and “The Performance 
of Agricultural Production In Marxist and Non-Marxist Nations,” 
 Comparative Economic Studies 33, no. 3/ 1991 : 95–127. These studies 
show that the centrally planned nations of Eastern Europe and 
the OECD nations of Western Europe did not have signifi cantly 
different GDP growth rates and GDP fl uctuations. For individual 
sectors, such as agriculture, the evidence is mixed and depends on 
the time period and the measure of fl uctuations. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760853.009
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 16 Mar 2020 at 16:16:23, subject to the
Capitalism Reassessed
— ✤ 210 ✤ —
factors other than the economic system seemed to be the 
primary explanation for these different growth results. 
Consequently, unless the downturn in production in the 
industrial capitalist nations becomes considerably worse 
and lasts much longer lasting than it appeared in 2010, it 
seem unlikely that major systemic transformations will 
occur for two reasons: First of all, radical alternatives to 
capitalism, such as communist command systems, have 
been discredited; secondly, systemic inertia is formida-
ble, as was shown in the Great Depression during the 
1930s, when few countries adopted total different eco-
nomic systems. 
 B.  Long-Term Economic Trends Possibly 
Infl uencing Institutional Change 
 This section briefl y outlines some challenging worldwide 
trends that are not easily met by existing institutions or 
current economic policies and that point to important 
institutional changes in the long-term future. 
 1.  Demographi c Changes 
 As everyone knows, the average age of the popula-
tion in the OECD is rising. This will lead to a fall in the 
ratio of people in the traditional working ages (twenty 
through sixty-four) to people aged sixty-fi ve and above. 
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For the OECD nations considered in this study, this ratio 
of working age to aged in 2000 averaged about 3.93; 
by 2040, it will be roughly 1.92. 5 In the latter year the 
ratio is predicted to be highest in nations with the  mostly 
Anglo-Saxon and the  Nordic economic systems and low-
est in nations with the  West European and  South European 
economic systems, where predicted low birth rates will 
exacerbate the problem. 
 Obviously, the aging of the population will strain gov-
ernmental pension and health care payments and old-
age insurance. If current laws remain in force in the 
OECD, governmental expenditures for the aged as a ratio 
of the GDP are predicted to rise about twelve percentage 
points between 2000 and 2040, an increase which may 
be unsustainable. 
 2.  Globalization 
 The word  “globalization” has many meanings – politi-
cal, legal, cultural, and economic. It also means that 
local events – phenomena as diverse as the incidence of 
disease and stock-market crashes – can have worldwide 
effects. The process of globalization also has many insti-
tutional impacts. For instance, enterprise governance, 
 5  The data in this and the following paragraph come from Frederic 
L. Pryor ,  Economic Systems of Foraging, Agricultural, and Industrial 
Societies ,  op. cit .,  Chapter 7 . 
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which varies considerably between nations, even those 
with the same economic system, appears to be gradu-
ally converging, at least if we can believe the anecdotes 
in the business press. In this section, however, we focus 
only on several common indicators of globalization (for-
eign trade, market integration, immigration, and inter-
national fl ows of capital) to gain an overview of some 
quantitative measures of the process. 
 Foreign trade , as a share of total production of goods 
and services, rose almost twenty percentage points 
between 1952 and 2000 for the twenty-one OECD 
nations under consideration. 6 Market integration – the 
linking of markets for goods and services – is measured 
by price convergence in the OECD countries, and this 
gradually occurred, at least in the latter part of this 
period. Immigration rates rose dramatically in the last 
half of the twentieth century. More specifi cally, for the 
twenty-one OECD nations, the annual ratio of new 
immigrants to the total population rose from 0.2 to 0.8 
percent between 1984 and 2000 (if illegal immigrants 
had been included, the increase would undoubtedly be 
higher). International capital (investment) fl ows have 
also soared: in the quarter century between 1972 and 
 6  Data for the discussion in this paragraph come from the OECD and 
Frederic L. Pryor ,  The Future of U.S. Capitalism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press,  2002 ),  Chapter 5 . 
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1997, estimated world capital fl ows measured in con-
stant prices, both direct (plant, equipment, and housing) 
and indirect (stocks and bonds) increased at an average 
annual rate of 8.3 percent, more than twice as fast as the 
growth of world GDP. 
 In the recession years between the third quarters of 
2007 and 2009, the average annual decline in the dollar 
value of exports of the OECD countries of goods was 6.6 
percent. 7 As in the case of the GDP, however, there was 
no signifi cant difference in the countries with different 
economic systems. 
 Globalization also means that adverse economic 
shocks arising from the actions of other countries will 
have a greater impact on the domestic economy of each 
nation. 8 It will take years to strengthen institutions so as 
 7  These data come from the OECD Web site  www.OECD.com and 
were the latest available at the time of writing. 
 8  One example of the international transmission of a local cri-
sis: early in the twenty-fi rst century a group of Wisconsin school 
boards borrowed money at a low interest rate from an Irish bank 
to purchase collateralized debt obligations (CDO) yielding a higher 
return. In 2008, when some of the underlying securities of the 
CDOs collapsed in value and the CDO issuers were unable to make 
their payments to the school districts, the latter could not then 
meet their interest payments on the loan from the Irish bank. This, 
in turn, placed the Irish bank in fi nancial jeopardy, and, since it 
was owned by a German bank, the parent bank also found itself 
in a precarious fi nancial position and had to be bailed out by the 
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to regulate international economic activities and prevent 
or mitigate worldwide shocks; meanwhile, we must rely 
on the informal coordination of policy actions in many 
countries, such as the G-20 group. In isolation, domestic 
actions to counter adverse macroeconomic events will 
become less effective. In a recession, for instance, the 
purchasing power arising from the increased govern-
mental expenditures of a single nation will be partially 
spent abroad, so that fi scal policy becomes less effec-
tive. Other important implications of the globalization 
process, including income convergence or divergence 
between countries, must be left for others to discuss. 
 3.  Increasing Scarcity of Natural Resources 9 
 The world’s total use of raw materials and foodstuffs has 
risen steeply in the past century because of the swell-
ing population and increasing per capita production. 
Although global population growth has been slowing 
in the past few decades, the consumption of these basic 
products will undoubtedly continue to grow as per capita 
income increases and, other things being equal, will result 
German government. There was no easy policy action that the 
German government could on its own have taken to have pre-
vented this international transmission of a fi nancial crisis. 
 9  This discussion draws heavily upon the sources and analysis in 
Pryor ,  The Future of U.S. Capitalism ,  op. cit .,  Chapter 6 . 
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in supplies become increasingly strained. Nevertheless, 
this Malthusian nightmare of critical scarcities of food-
stuffs and raw material and of their skyrocketing prices, 
did not come true in the twentieth century. It was kept 
at bay by technological progress in extracting, growing, 
refi ning, and processing these products, by the discov-
ery of new mineral deposits, by the use of new land for 
agriculture, and by the production of new products that 
required fewer raw materials. 
 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether technology will 
continue to win the race with scarcity. In the fi rst decade 
of the twenty-fi rst century, the prices of many raw mate-
rials have risen much faster than the general price index. 
Moreover, as the long-term price of oil has climbed, the 
costs of some nonpetroleum sources of energy have 
increased as well. Given the stationary or declining oil 
production in most major oil-producing nations and 
the relatively few new discoveries of large oil deposits, 
it seems likely the long-term rising price of energy will 
continue until alternative energy sources become much 
more fully utilized. 
 Rising food prices seem likely as well: between 2000 
and 2007 world food prices rose 80 percent, and many 
fear even steeper increases in the future. Probable under-
lying causes include global warming, water shortages, 
and the diversion of grains from food to the production 
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of ethanol, which has, in turn, led to a reduction in the 
land used for other crops and feed for animals. 10 
 If the relative prices of raw materials, energy, and 
foodstuffs rise, the low-income population will be the 
hardest hit, since raw-material intensive products and 
foods will cost more and thus constitute a higher share 
of the spending of this group. Thus, the distribution of 
real income will become more unequal. Moreover, the 
higher price of raw materials also means that for a given 
expenditure, fewer goods can be purchased, and for a 
given dollar of investment, less growth of goods and ser-
vices will result. 
 4.  Other Challenges 
 a.  Savings and Growth.  Where population is ris-
ing and where people spend down their wealth dur-
ing retirement, the overall savings rate should decline 
under normal circumstances. as the number of workers 
per retirees declines. More specifi cally, empirical studies 
 10  The datum on world food prices comes from Food and Agriculture 
Organization, “FAO Food Price Index,”  www.fao.org/worldfood-
situation/FoodPriceIndex/en/ (accessed October  2008 ). In some 
countries, such as the United States, food prices increased only 
about 20 percent in the same period, which was roughly the same 
as the consumer price index. 
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show that a 1 percent rise in the ratio of the elderly to 
workers in the economy results in a decline in the ratio 
of savings to GDP of more than 0.3 percent. 11 Under even 
the most optimistic assumptions, the savings rate in the 
OECD countries in 2040 will be only slightly more than 
half the 2000 level (or even lower under more realistic 
assumptions). This means that economic growth of the 
OECD economies, in turn, will be considerably lower, 
other things being equal. Since economic growth often 
leads to higher employment and raises incomes of dis-
advantaged groups, the decline in economic growth will 
remove an important social lubricant. As a result, ten-
sions between income groups may rise in the future. To 
avoid increased political repression, alternative institu-
tions for alleviating such economic problems may have 
to be devised. 
 b.  Microeconomic Volatility.  Volatility  can arise at 
the microeconomic level as well as the macroeconomic. 
 11  The results of various empirical studies of the impact on savings of 
a rise in the elderly as a share of the population are summarized by 
Robert Stowe England in  The Macroeconomic Impact of Global Aging 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
 2002 ). For a simulation model of the U.S. economy that takes these 
effects into account, see Frederic L. Pryor , “Demographic Effects 
on Personal Saving in the Future,”  Southern Economic Journal 69, 
no. 3 (January 2003): 541–60. 
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In the United States, for instance, certain microeconomic 
volatility measures have increased in the last third of a 
century, and a number of studies suggest that family 
incomes vary much more from year to year than they 
used to, 12 a phenomenon which puts affected families at 
greater risk. Risk has also risen for American families 
who fi nd it hard to obtain affordable health insurance 
because of their preexisting health conditions or because 
their pensions are switching from defi ned-benefi t to 
defi ned-contribution plans (such as 401 (k) plans). 13 This 
trend may, however, be modifi ed by the health care bill 
signed into law in 2010, although, at the time of writing, 
it is diffi cult to know if this law will survive legal chal-
lenges. Of course, those living in capitalist countries with 
established universal health insurance or with predomi-
nantly defi ned-benefi t pension plans do not face these 
 12  Karen E. Dynan , Douglas W. Elmendorf , and Daniel E. Sichel , 
in “The Evolution of Household Income Volatility,”  Finance and 
Economics Discussion Series no. 61 (Washington, DC: Federal 
Reserve Board,  2007 ), present their estimates of this volatility 
and also provide an extremely useful survey of previous work on 
the topic by others. 
 13  Peter Gosselin , in  High Wire: The Precarious Financial Lives of 
American Families (New York: Basic Books,  2008 ), discusses a wide 
variety of other mounting fi nancial risks faced by American fam-
ilies. Unfortunately, I have been unable to fi nd comparable data 
for other OECD nations. 
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risks. Unfortunately, comparable long-term data on vola-
tility of family incomes for other OECD countries are not 
available, but such data might reveal a similar increase 
in microeconomic volatility because foreign trade has a 
larger role in their economies. 
 c.  Changing Relations Between Capital and 
Labor .  Until recently, trends in the ownership and 
management of enterprises did not point toward dra-
matic institutional changes in production institu-
tions. 14 During the fi nancial crisis starting in 2007 and 
2008, however, many governments bought shares in 
 14  Three quite different indicators can be used to examine these 
issues: monopolization, as measured by the degree to which the 
top four or eight fi rms dominate the shipments of a narrowly 
defi ned industries; agglomeration, as measured by the share of 
total employment or industrial assets accounted for by the larg-
est one hundred or one thousand fi rms; and the average size 
of enterprises, as measured by labor force or assets. Despite the 
growing number of mergers between enterprises, particularly 
in the 1990s, trends in these indicators in the latter part of the 
twentieth century give no cause for alarm and portend little 
dramatic change in the coming decades. In Pryor ,  The Future of 
U.S. Capitalism ,  op. cit . I discuss U.S. evidence on these matters; 
for Europe over a shorter time period, see Mikael Stenkula , “The 
European Size Distribution of Firms and Employment.” Research 
Institute of Industrial Economics, IFN  Working Paper no. 683 
(Stockholm: RIIE,  2006 ). 
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enterprises – primarily banks, but in some cases pro-
ducers as well – to provide them with liquidity and to 
prevent bankruptcy. At the time of writing, it is unclear 
whether such steps toward “socialism” will be reversed 
after the economy recovers or whether they represent a 
new direction and will be extended to other sectors of the 
economy. In brief, will the General Motors Corporation 
(GM), which was partially nationalized in 2009, be 
known in the future as “Government Motors?” 
 Labor markets may change as the labor force becomes 
more and more heterogeneous in terms of skills, ethnic-
ity, and lifestyle. In most OECD nations, working-class 
solidarity appears to be declining, as manifested in a 
falling share of unionized workers in the labor force. 15 
The weakening of labor unions has led to greater wage 
inequality and less job security, trends reinforced both by 
rising imports of labor-intensive goods from developing 
countries that pay much lower wages and by an increased 
willingness by employers in many countries to use wage 
 15  Several of the  Nordic countries are exceptions to this general-
ization. Underlying data are provided by Miriam Golden , et al., 
“Postwar Trade-Union Organization and Industrial Relations 
in Twelve Countries,” pp. 194–230 in Herbert Kitschelt et al., 
eds.,  Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Jelle Visser , “Union 
Membership Statistics in roughly 24 Countries,”  Monthly Labor 
Review 129, no. 1 (January  2006 ): 38–49. 
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differentials as part of incentive packages to encourage 
more work from their employees. These trends reinforce 
the growing income inequality arising from higher rela-
tive prices of foodstuffs and raw materials. 
 C.  Types of Systemic Change 
 In  Chapter 4 , we delineated four distinct economic sys-
tems  of advanced capitalist nation, defi ned in terms of 
clusters of complementary institutions. This result sug-
gests a certain “logic of institutions.” That is, an economic 
institution cannot be wildly out of sync with all the other 
institutions in the economic system. Thus, as a system 
changes, all of its institutions must change in a related 
fashion at roughly the same time. An empirical demon-
stration of this concept using the various institutional 
characteristics presented in  Economic Freedom of the World 
shows that institutions and policies associated with dif-
ferent facets of economic freedom change together both 
over time and also across countries at the same time. 16 
 16  The calculation is carried out by Russell S. Sobel and Christopher J. 
Coyne in “Cointegrating Institutions: The Time-Series  Properties 
of Country Institutional Measures,” submitted for publication, 
2010. Their data on institutions come from James D. Gwartney and 
Robert A. Lawson ,  Economic Freedom of the World (Vancouver: Fraser 
Institute, 2008). 
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 Three critical questions arise from such consider-
ations: If institutional changes occur in OECD countries, 
will the same countries remain in the same economic 
system, that is, will they still cluster together? Will 
nations with the same economic system become even 
more similar? And will the different economic systems 
tend to converge? 
 These questions concern complex changes over time, 
and an empirical study to answer them by delineating 
economic systems in past years is diffi cult to carry out 
because we have few quantitative measures of institu-
tions before 1990 – in fact, I could locate only eleven. 
Although we cannot hope for conclusive answers, we 
can obtain some tentative and tantalizing results. 
 1.  Parallel versus Random Systemic Change 
 The “logic of institutions” suggests two types of paral-
lel change to investigate. The fi rst is  parallel institutional 
change , which occurs when the clustering of countries in 
economic system s remains the same, even though the 
individual institutional components of these systems 
(or the measures of these institutions) have changed in 
value. For instance, over a given period, the ratio of pub-
lic expenditures to GDP in the  West European countries 
can always be higher than that in the  mostly Anglo-Saxon 
group of nations, even though the values of these ratios 
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vary considerably at different points in time. These paral-
lel changes can be contrasted with random institutional 
change, which occurs when changes in the institutional 
indicators follow a haphazard pattern and are quite dif-
ferent among countries that formerly had the same eco-
nomic system. 
 Did the OECD nations manifest parallel or random 
institutional changes? Since these nations had largely 
recovered from the effects of World War II by the end of 
the 1950s, I start the analysis with data for four bench-
mark years thereafter, namely 1960, 1970, 1980, and 
1990, and then determine the rank orderings of the aver-
age values of the four economic systems for each of the 
eleven institutional indicators in the benchmark years. 
 The test results are clean. For ten out of the eleven 
institutional indicators, the rank orderings of the averages 
of the four economic systems were the same in all four 
years. In sum, the OECD nations have exhibited parallel 
institutional change. Nevertheless, important changes 
in the values of these indicators occurred. For instance, 
the ratio of public consumption to total (public plus pri-
vate) consumption in the  Nordic nations was roughly the 
same as the OECD average in the early 1950s, but it had 
moved ahead of all other OECD systems by 1960, and in 
the following years this gap widened even more. Thus, a 
distinctive characteristic of the current  Nordic economic 
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system – their welfare state – began to emerge only in 
the mid-1950s, even though the ideological seeds may 
have been planted decades earlier. 
 One immediate objection to this analysis of paral-
lel institutional change can be raised. The comparisons 
involved cover only thirty years, and the relationships 
might not hold over a longer period. For instance, data 
on public expenditures extending back to 1870 show 
sharp breaks in the rank ordering of nations before and 
after World War II. 17 Similarly, with regard to the open-
ness of foreign trade, as measured by average tariff rates, 
the rank orderings of the four groups of nations greatly 
changed over the last 120 years, showing sharp breaks 
after both world wars. 18 This indicates that the logic of 
 17  The underlying data come from Thomas R. Cusack and Susanne 
Fuchs , “Parteien, Institutionen und Staatsausgaben.” In Herbert 
Obinger, et al., eds.,  Politische Ö konomie: Politik und wirtschaftliche 
Leistungsprofi le in OECD Demokratien (Opladen: Leske und Büdrich, 
2003), 321–54 However, I have had to make a number of esti-
mates to extend some of the series back to 1870. Peter H. Lindert , 
 Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press,  2004 ), 
shows that many of the differences in the rank orderings among 
nations can be traced to changes in the extent of the voting fran-
chise and the degree of democracy. 
 18  The graph of the degree of trade openness over time is complex. 
Tariff rates in a worldwide sample of thirty-fi ve nations slowly 
rose from the 1870s to the fi rst decade of the twentieth century, 
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institutions is a phenomenon primarily relevant just in 
the short and medium runs. Of course, this makes long-
run prediction of changes in economic systems more 
diffi cult. 
 The second type of parallel change is  parallel country 
change , which occurs when countries with the same 
economic system  remain clustered together at differ-
ent points in time when all institutions are taken into 
account, even as the pattern of their complementary insti-
tutions changes. In contrast, random country changes 
occur when countries that clustered together in one 
period cease to do so later. This happens when countries 
then rose dramatically from the 1920s to the late 1930s, so that at 
their peak they were roughly twice as high as the late-nineteenth-
century average, and then slowly declined from the late 1940s 
to the 1990s. See Christopher Blattman , Michael A. Clements , 
and Jeffrey G. Williamson , “Who Protected and Why? Tariffs 
the World Around 1870–1938,” Harvard Institute of Economic 
Research  Discussion Paper no. 2010 (Cambridge, MA: HIER,  2003 ). 
During these three periods, the relative position of countries 
changed considerably. For instance, the U.S. was a high-tariff 
nation in the late-nineteenth century, but in the interwar period 
(up to the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill in the early 
1930s) had relatively low tariffs, compared both to previous eras 
and contemporary rates in other countries. Obviously certain 
changes in the external international economic environment 
have also been important, such as the infl uence after World War 
II of the GATT treaty (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) 
and the creation of the European common market. 
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in one system that had higher quantitative measures for 
particular institutions than those of another system no 
longer manifest such differences in the next period. 
 To examine parallel country changes, I employ a clus-
ter analysis to determine the economic systems in each 
of the four years under investigation. Unfortunately, the 
eleven indicators available for the historical analysis are 
not necessarily representative of the entire economic 
system. 19 In fact, for the overlap year 1990, an eleven-
indicator comparison placed only three-quarters of the 
countries in the same clusters into which they fell when 
a forty-indicator comparison was used. In the 1960–1980 
period, between 48 and 57 percent of the countries were 
found in the same clusters to which the forty-indicator 
analysis for 1990 had allotted them. 
 These results are not conclusive, and three interpreta-
tions can be offered: (1)  parallel country change occurs, but 
it is not very strong; (2) the eleven indicators are really 
not representative of all the key economic institutions; 
or (3) economic systems are mutable over time. Case-
study materials can provide some clues, so let us focus on 
the case of the United Kingdom in the postwar period, a 
 19  This discussion draws upon evidence presented in Frederic L. 
Pryor ,  Economic Systems of Foraging, Agricultural, and Industrial 
Societies ,  op. cit .,  Chapter 7 . 
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well-known example of a country experiencing consid-
erable systemic change. 
 In a survey of a group of specialists in economic sys-
tems, a majority rated Great Britain in the early 1960s as 
having more national planning and government direc-
tion of the economy than most other OECD nations. 20 My 
own cluster analysis using eleven institutional indicators 
placed the United Kingdom in the  West European system 
in 1960 and not the  mostly Anglo-Saxon system, which has 
had a more laissez-faire economic system. For the late 
1990s, a much more systematic study, using both a survey 
of laws and observer opinions, put the United Kingdom 
 among those OECD nations with the least governmen-
tal participation in the economy. 21 Correspondingly, my 
own analysis of the same eleven indicators in 1990 also 
placed the United Kingdom among those with a  mostly 
Anglo-Saxon economic system. In brief, over the thirty 
years from 1960 to 1990, the capitalist economic system 
of the United Kingdom had greatly changed. 
 The high degree of government intervention in the 
U.K. economy in the 1950s and early 1960s might be 
 20  Myron H. Ross , “Fluctuations in Economic Activity,”  American 
Economic Review 55, no. 1 (March  1965 ): 158–61. 
 21  Giuseppe Nicoletti and Frederic L. Pryor , “Subjective and Objective 
Measures of the Extent of Government Regulation,”  Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): 433–49. 
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attributed to the self-reinforcing process of a slow war-
time recovery and inertia in removing inappropriate 
wartime controls of the economy. But disappointing 
economic performance in the fi rst three decades follow-
ing World War II resulted in a shift in the balance of 
political forces and, most likely, in ideology as well. In 
analyzing the U.K.’s economic system, most commen-
tators have focused on the 1979 election of Margaret 
Thatcher , whose government sold off state enterprises, 
reduced labor unions’ infl uence in national economic 
policy making, and, as briefl y noted above, cut back the 
governments’ other roles in the economy. In 1990, her 
last year in offi ce, the economic system of the United 
Kingdom had become like that of other nations in the 
 mostly Anglo-Saxon group. But if we look at the eleven his-
torical indicators discussed above, this process appears to 
have begun in the mid-1970s: Thatcher’s policies appear, 
in part, as the culmination of a previous trend. 
 The lesson from this example is that a country can 
change its economic system, even if the changes in par-
ticular institutions are not well synchronized with other 
institutions. This requires, however, that the political 
leadership be tough and strong, follow consistent poli-
cies, and be able to maintain enough political support 
for a suffi ciently long period to overcome the resistance 
arising from the pain that such policies infl ict because of 
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the inconsistencies between institutions that have and 
have not been yet changed. 
 One can carry out other tests of parallel country 
changes, but the results come as no surprise. 22 The 
results above, however, show that parallel institutional 
change appears to be much stronger than parallel coun-
try change. Both types of change also provide support 
for the logic-of-institutions approach, at least in the short 
and middle runs. 
 2.  Converging or Diverging Systemic Changes 
 Do economic systems tend to become more or less similar 
to each other over time? We can explore this long-term 
issue by fi rst carrying out a cluster analysis of institu-
tions in developing economies, using virtually the same 
institutional indicators as for the OECD nations. Then by 
comparing the average differences between the clusters 
in the two set of countries, as well as the degree to which 
these clusters explain the differences between nations 
with the same economic system, we can gain some idea 
about systemic changes over time. 23 
 22  Most importantly, these tests included a concordance analysis of 
the rank orders of countries. 
 23  Frederic L. Pryor , “Economic Systems of Developing Nations,” 
 Comparative Economic Studies 48, no. 1 (March  2006 ): 77–98. The 
comparisons between the sample of OECD and developing 
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 The results can be quickly summarized: the clusters 
of the developing economies are further apart from 
each other than the OECD countries; moreover, the 
differences between same-system nations are greater 
in the former than the latter group of nations, that 
is, the individual clusters cover a much larger institu-
tional space among the developing countries. In brief, 
both between-system and within-system distances 
are greater in the developing economies. This appears 
reasonable if we consider the much-different starting 
points at which the developing economies began to 
enter the modern age and the hypothesis, oft-expressed 
by modernization theorists, that industrial economies 
impose more constraints on economic operations than 
agricultural economies do. Agricultural economies are 
much less complex and have many fewer institutional 
interconnections. 
 When a similar test is carried out for the OECD 
nations with just the eleven available institutional indi-
cators for 1960 through 1990, no apparent trends can 
be found in the between-cluster and within-cluster dis-
tances. Again, however, we are faced with a problem of 
interpretation: Are we getting these results because the 
eleven-institution sample is not representative, because 
economies are made in Pryor,  Economic Systems of Foraging, 
Agricultural, and Industrial Societies ,  op. cit .,  Chapter 7 . 
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the time period is too short, or because convergence is 
solely a long-term phenomenon? 
 3.  Speed of Change 
 Institutions can  seem frozen in time. For instance, in the 
OECD nations, the measures of the central bank’s policy 
independence from the Ministry of Finance showed little 
variation from the 1950s to the 1990s, that is, until the 
establishment of the European Central Bank. The most 
noticeable exception was the increasing policy indepen-
dence of the  South European central banks, which went 
from well below the OECD average in 1951 to about 
average in 1990. 
 In other cases, institutional changes were slow but 
apparent, and in one direction. For example, in the OECD 
economies governmental expenditures (both consump-
tion and transfers) as a ratio of GDP rose steadily over 
this period from 26.3 percent in 1952 to 44.5 percent in 
1990. Similarly, indicators of other institutions, such as 
worker protection against job loss and openness of trade 
in goods, services, and capital, also showed a steady 
increase over time. 
 In still other cases, institutional changes have been 
reversed: that is, the system changed in the short run 
but not in the long run. For instance, in the year imme-
diately following the end of World War II, there was a 
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strong wave of nationalization of industry in most OECD 
nations. In the ensuing four decades, however, public 
ownership of the means of production declined in most 
of these same nations. 24 As noted above, government 
ownership also increased during the fi nancial crisis 
that started in late 2007, and this institutional change 
may (or may not) be temporary. Other cases of the rise 
and fall of particular institutions are more diffi cult to 
characterize. 25 
 Finally, systemic change can sometimes occur quite 
rapidly. Military occupation and/or a political revolution 
can result in a dramatic and rapid overhaul of the eco-
nomic system, as was seen in the fi rst decade after World 
War II in Central and Eastern Europe. In these countries, 
the imposition of a new economic system, communism, 
was bloody and repressive. Rapid systemic change again 
 24  Piet Angelo Toninelli ,  The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in 
the Western World (New York: Cambridge University Press,  2000 ). 
 25  For instance, it is sometimes argued that corporatist institu-
tions reveal a similar rise and fall. Certainly, some trappings of 
corporatism disappeared in some European countries after the 
mid-1970s, following the oil shock and subsequent economic 
diffi culties. Nevertheless, according to the research I reported 
in “Corporatism as an Economic System,”  Journal of Comparative 
Economics 12, no. 3 (September 1988): 317–44, the tide of corpo-
ratism was not ebbing in the OECD as a whole, at least up to 1990, 
even though such a trend is found in some OECD countries. 
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occurred in this region from the early 1990s to the early 
2000s after the fall of communism; and, while it was not 
bloody, it, too, was painful for large portions of the pop-
ulation. 26 Rapid systemic changes can also be triggered, 
as noted above, from defeat in warfare or a disastrous 
economic crisis. 
 For the industrial OECD nations, rapid systemic change 
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. As one may 
infer from the previous discussion, there are few indica-
tors (except for, possibly, the nationalization of industry) 
that we will see major shifts toward one particular type 
of capitalism rather than another. Furthermore, paral-
lel country change seems likely to persist: in the near 
future the grouping of nations into particular economic 
systems will probably be quite similar to what it is today, 
as will the relative degree to which certain institutions 
are manifest in the various countries. 
 On the other hand, it also seems highly likely that the 
capitalist economic systems of industrial nations will 
gradually converge in the very long run. First, most of 
these nations belong to the European Union, which is 
trying to harmonize the business practices and laws of 
its member nations. Second, all of the nations belong to 
 26  See Anders Åslund ,  How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation 
of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Europe (New York, 
NY : Cambridge University Press,  2007 ). 
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certain international organizations, such as the Bank 
for International Settlements in Basel or the World 
Intellectual Property Organization in Geneva, which are 
likewise aiming for uniformity. Third, between the early 
1950s and 2000, differences in the level of economic 
development (measured by per capita GDPs) of the vari-
ous nations narrowed considerably, and this trend seems 
likely to continue in the future. 27 
 D.  Future Systemic Change 
in the OECD Nations 
 Having looked briefl y at the types and processes of sys-
temic change, we might try to speculate on exactly how 
these economic systems will be different in the far future. 
But while the discussion up to now of parallel institu-
tional and systemic change, systemic convergence, and 
speed of systemic change may vary in the future, these 
concepts do not help very much in predicting particular 
changes in individual systems. 
 However, several ways to analyze future systemic 
changes are still open to us. Since we used forty indica-
tors of economic institutions to defi ne the four economic 
 27  The data underlying this statement come from Angus Maddison , 
 The World Economy (Paris: OECD,  2003 ). 
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systems of the industrial OECD nations, we could exam-
ine how the forces underlying institutional change will 
impact each of the indicators. A less tedious method is to 
explore the most probable changes in what I believe to 
be the institutions most likely to experience important 
transformations. These changes mostly refer to indus-
trial capitalist countries in general; only a country-by-
country survey of laws and institutions can reveal which 
economic systems will be most affected. 
 1.  Financial Sector 
 As indicated in  Chapter 6 , the world economic crisis 
starting in 2007/2008 was primarily triggered by events 
in the fi nancial sector . If governments wish to avoid sim-
ilar downturns in the future, the fi nancial sector must 
experience important institutional and policy changes 
in the years to come. It is unclear, however, how large 
these changes will be, given the array of powerful politi-
cal forces opposing any major modifi cations. Change 
might be confi ned primarily to regulation procedures, or 
it might go further and alter the structure of other sec-
tors as well. 
 Regarding bank regulation, a recent IMF analy-
sis of commercial bank performance in eleven OECD 
nations showed clearly that governmental regulation 
of bank liquidity and of the relative roles of bank-asset 
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funding from deposits and from borrowing, signifi cantly 
affected bank performance and failures in late 2007. 28 
This suggests that if the regulatory regime is improved, 
major structural reforms may not be necessary in some 
countries. 
 Markets for various exotic derivatives, sub-prime 
mortgages, collateralized debt obligations, credit default 
options, and similar fi nancial instruments will undoubt-
edly be more constrained in the future. 29 For instance, 
banks bundling many mortgages into a new securities 
may be required to retain a certain percentage of these 
 28  Lev Ratnovski and Rocco Huang . “Why Are Canadian Banks 
More Resilient?” IMF  Working Paper WP/09/152 (Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009). Another study by 
Andrea Beltratti and René Stulz, “Why Did Some Banks Perform 
Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the 
Impact of Governance and Regulation,” The National Bureau of 
Economic Research  Working Paper 15180 (Cambridge, MA: NBER, 
 2009 ) also shows the importance of certain regulatory policies, 
although it places more emphasis on bank governance as a factor 
of bank performance during the crisis period from 2007 up to 
2009. 
 29  It is noteworthy that Africa, where most countries limit the types 
of activities in which fi nancial institutions can engage, was the 
only continent untouched by the recent fi nancial crisis (at least 
up to the time of writing). This suggests one useful way in which 
the more “advanced” countries might change their economic 
systems. 
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new securities, so that they will bear part of the risk of 
default and, thus, will be more conscious of the risks they 
are passing on to others. This percentage might also be 
adjustable by the central bank, just as some central banks 
can adjust the margin for individuals buying securities 
on credit . In addition, certain banking practices, such 
as “liar loans” (loans given with no investigation of the 
borrowers’ stated income or ability to repay) (these were 
also called NINJA loans, indicating that borrowers had 
no income, no job, and no assets), or the sale of high-
interest (sub-prime) mortgages to those with little ability 
to pay them off might be similarly restricted. Stricter con-
trols may also be placed on the activities of hedge funds 
and other fi rms leveraging their capital by borrowing at 
low interest rates to speculate on allegedly high-yielding 
assets. It also seems likely that the degree of fi nancial 
leveraging by banks, “nonbank banks,” hedge funds, and 
the like, will also be further restricted. In brief, we can 
probably expect constraints on a great many fi nancial 
activities, businesses, and individuals that heretofore have 
received little governmental pressure to reduce fi nancial 
leveraging. Whether these measures will be suffi cient to 
avoid the kind of economic shocks recently experienced 
by the world’s fi nancial sector remains to be seen. 
 Structural transformations of the fi nancial sector, orig-
inating either internally or in response to government 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511760853.009
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Swarthmore College Libraries, on 16 Mar 2020 at 16:16:23, subject to the
Capitalism Reassessed
— ✤ 238 ✤ —
 30  Thorsten Beck , Asli Demirgüç–Kunta , and Ross Levine, “Bank 
Concentration, Competition, and Crises: First Results,”  Journal of 
Banking and Finance 30, no. 5 ( 2006 ): 1581–1603, presents evi-
dence for this claim. 
actions, may also take place in some countries. An 
important transformation occurring during the fi nan-
cial crisis that began in late 2007 was the considerable 
consolidation of banks in some OECD nations, as strong 
banks purchased weaker ones to save them either from 
illiquidity or bankruptcy. At that time, this trend did 
not cause great alarm since some econometric evidence 
suggests that countries with more concentrated banking 
structures are less likely to experience banking crises. 30 
Nevertheless, increasing concentration of the fi nancial 
sector can, in some cases, lead to increasing concentra-
tion of investment or production, which has negative 
consequences. The growing importance of sovereign 
wealth funds (investment funds controlled by govern-
mental agencies) in certain nations with large deposits 
of raw materials and oil tends also to promote central-
ization of the fi nancial sector. Although governmental 
actions can limit concentration of the fi nancial sector, it 
is unclear whether these steps will be taken. 
 2.  Government Sector 
 In major respects, the power of governments to infl u-
ence aggregate economic activities will become weaker. 
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Such a process can already be seen in federal countries, 
such as the United States or Germany , where the sub-
ordinate governmental units (for instance, the states 
of the United States, Länder in Germany) have little 
impact on macroeconomic aggregates in their areas of 
jurisdiction. Moreover, as we saw earlier, increasing glo-
balization will probably lead to greater aggregate vola-
tility since globalization makes nations more vulnerable 
to economic shocks originating abroad. At the same 
time, moreover, the national governments will have 
fewer macroeconomic tools with which to offset cycli-
cal swings because the increased volume of imports will 
diminish the impact of governmental intervention. That 
is, more of the new purchasing power (money) pumped 
into the economy by the government to offset declines in 
consumption will go abroad rather than circulate inter-
nally. Similarly, attempts by governments to stimulate 
investment by lowering interest rates may speed up the 
outfl ow of investment funds to countries with higher 
interest rates. The governments of the European OECD 
nations have essentially handed over their monetary 
power to the European Central Bank, which may not 
be willing to take interest rate actions that would affect 
all countries in the monetary union just to assist a few 
distressed countries. 
 Globalization  will lead to a similar weakening of regu-
latory powers, as countries are forced to coordinate their 
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microeconomic policies – either through a suprana-
tional organization, treaties, or by very frequent contact. 
National regulations are also enfeebled by the increas-
ing importance of services, which are diffi cult to con-
trol because of their heterogeneity and complexity. For 
instance, a contributing cause of the 2007/2008 fi nan-
cial crisis was the sale of derivative securities by fi nancial 
companies. These securities were so complex that few 
people – including the professional rating agencies – were 
able (or willing) to assess their risks. In the United States, 
the institutions selling such securities did not care about 
the risk as long as it could be passed on to others, and 
when the liabilities could not be paid off, a chain reac-
tion of bankruptcies began. 
 But just as governments fi nd themselves less able to 
control the economy, citizens will be expecting them to 
do more: they will demand governmental actions that 
protect family income from the greater volatility accom-
panying globalization, especially since individuals can 
not easily take countermeasures by themselves. Such 
governmental policies would include both direct trans-
fer payments and various indirect actions such as greater 
regulation of private pensions and more constraints on 
markets for consumer goods and services. Many of these 
measures, which have been in place in the  Nordic coun-
tries, will have to be introduced in some of the other 
economic systems as well. 
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 During the global recession starting in late 2007, the 
share of public expenditures in the GDP rose to stimulate 
the economy by providing additional purchasing power, 
to bail out various fi nancial enterprises and other enter-
prises, and to pay for greater welfare expenditures. How 
long these additional expenditures will last is, at the time 
of writing, unknown. However, it seems certain that the 
share of public expenditures in the GDP will rise in the 
future, driven by the rising ratio of the elderly to those 
in the working cohorts and by the rising costs of medical 
care as increasingly expensive cures are brought on line. 
Of course, countermeasures could be taken: raising the 
retirement age and/or the age at which pensions from 
the social insurance system are received; reducing the 
per capita amount of these payments; rationing the med-
ical services fi nanced by the government; or cutting back 
on other government expenditures, such as education, 
defense, agriculture, or economic regulation. Politically, 
however, these steps are very diffi cult to take and elected 
governments propose or implement such measures only 
at their peril. 
 3.  The Labor Sector 
 The political and economic power of workers seems to 
be trending downward in most OECD nations. The share 
of union workers has fallen in most countries, a trend 
that is likely to continue as service workers become an 
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ever-rising share of the labor force. In some – but not 
all – OECD nations, this weakening of workers’ power 
can also be seen in the declining share of labor income 
in the national income (after removing the labor income 
of corporate offi cers) 31 and a widening wage inequality, 
abetted by an ever-increasing downward pressure on the 
wages of low-skilled workers as labor-intensive imports 
from developing countries that pay their workers lower 
wages enter the market. 
 As noted above, the aging of the population in the 
OECD nations will result in less net saving and lower 
economic growth. This may well exacerbate the social 
tensions arising from widening income inequalities 
because countries will be less able to alleviate poverty 
through economic growth alone. A fraying of the social 
fabric may also result from the growing heterogeneity of 
the population that is brought on by immigration. For 
instance, studies show that democratic governments in 
areas with more heterogeneous populations spend less 
on social services and education. On the other hand, 
alienation from the government, as manifested by such 
indicators as the willingness of people to cheat on their 
taxes, does not seem to have changed very much for 
 31  For the United States, relevant data are provided and analyzed by 
Philip Jefferson and Frederic L. Pryor , “Dynamics of U.S. Factor 
Income Shares,”  Journal of Income Distribution , 19, no. 1 (March  2010 ). 
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the OECD as a whole, at least in the 1990s. 32 Again, we 
face the problem that we can identify general systemic 
changes without being able to determine exactly how 
individual systems will change. 
 4.  A Brief Summary 
 The discussion up to now has provided a general fl a-
vor of possible future changes in the economic system. 
Each nation or economic system has its peculiar circum-
stances, of course, and predicting the individual trajecto-
ries of each is beyond the scope of this the present survey. 
Therefore, discussion in this chapter has focused on the 
direction of general changes in institutions rather than 
to specifi c changes in particular countries or systems. 
 While we can point to imperfections in current insti-
tutions that compose the economic system and speculate 
on how they can be improved, it is much more diffi cult 
to determine how any changes taken will fi t together, 
especially since modifi cations in one institution may 
 32  Ronald Inglehart et al.,  Human Beliefs and Values (Mexico 
City: Siglo XXI Editores,  2004 ), present survey data for many 
nations on responses to the question of whether it is justifi able 
to cheat on one(s taxes if one has a chance (question F116). For 
the OECD nations between 1990 and 2000, no signifi cant change 
in responses occurred, even when per capita GDP and economic 
system are held constant. 
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infl uence the performance of another. For instance, 
alterations in the fi nancial system may lead to less invest-
ment and economic growth, which, in turn, can affect 
the operation of the labor market. Thus, gaining insight 
into the operation of the entire system, which embraces 
many different but interconnected, institutions, is a par-
ticularly diffi cult task. 
 Recent election campaigning in various OECD nations 
leads to the unfortunate conclusion that few politicians 
have a suffi ciently consistent vision of the future eco-
nomic system to make wise policy decisions or to imple-
ment a consistent program for changing the economic 
system. 
 E.  Parting Words 
 This short book has covered a great deal of territory. 
We have seen why capitalism emerged in northwestern 
Europe in the nineteenth century rather than in other 
parts of the world. There were a variety of enabling fac-
tors in Northwestern Europe, including a higher level of 
economic development, a system of law and order that 
more or less prevailed, protection of private property, the 
existence of institutions that helped to spread new tech-
nological knowledge, and national governments that gen-
erally provided the necessary roads and other overhead 
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capital but did not greatly interfere in production. Among 
the current industrialized nations of the OECD, we saw 
how the confi gurations of economic institutions lead us 
to delineate four economic systems. 
 The economic and social/economic performance indi-
cators of the OECD countries in the sample fall into the 
same distinct country groups as the countries in the eco-
nomic and social systems. Although these economic sys-
tems do not greatly differ in their performance, they do 
show considerable differences in their social/economic 
outcomes. In the economic sphere, for instance, although 
the  mostly Anglo-Saxon nations have signifi cant invest-
ment effi ciency (that is, higher output per unit of addi-
tional investment), but also greater income inequality at 
high incomes and higher levels of air pollution, they do 
not signifi cantly differ in most other performance mea-
sures. In a given economic system, countries that score 
higher for a one set of performance indicators may score 
lower than countries than other economic systems for a 
different set of indicators, so that a trade-off of perfor-
mance variables seems to occur. We could not, however, 
fi nd any evidence that any of these economic systems 
produced happier people. 
 Barring cataclysmic economic events, we can expect 
current OECD economic systems to evolve slowly and in 
a piecemeal fashion, with changes in a few institutions 
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occurring in one period, followed in subsequent periods 
by adjustments in other institutions. Although it is dif-
fi cult to make predictions, I have tried to point to those 
areas in which system change is most likely to occur in 
the fi elds of fi nance, government, and labor. 
 This reassessment of capitalism allows us to reconsider 
the big questions about our economic system: What is 
capitalism? How does it usually perform? Where is the 
system going, and do we need to change it totally to 
avoid a repetition of our current economic diffi culties? I 
hope that I have provided a new perspective from which 
to address these questions. It is my hope that this book 
has provided fresh insights into capitalism and on some 
potential changes to this system that may happen in the 
future. 
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